09721215 Essays - The Face Of Battle, John Keegan, Military, Battle

09721215 Essays - The Face Of Battle, John Keegan, Military, Battle 09721215 rdNlAr.lin 1-kr,1-.Nrnle.r.^.. r. nef riltr;Cnni-;r.r., kr. lima-n kevik "1-,./n;"#-Al ,-Amel irv1-r,11.-....411,-Al rvf .1-1...e.00 rdNlAr.lin 1-kr,1-.Nrnle.r.^.. r. nef riltr;Cnni-;r.r., kr. lima-n kevik "1-,./n;"#-Al ,-Amel irv1-r,11.-....411,-Al rvf .1-1...e.John Keegan is Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (the British equivalent of West Point). He admits in the very beginning that he has never been in battle, nor near a battle. In those two statements is an opening key to this book. 7 Face of Battle is an effort to derive from the historical sources a better understanding of w it is like to be in battlenot just to narrate the events, but to come closer to a realization c what the participants felt. The method is a description and analysis of three battles: Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. Keegan surrounds the battle accounts with an introductory chapter and a conclusion, which provide much of the value of his work. The method is justified, for not only are the battle accounts fascinating and innovative in themselves, but they demonstrate the observations made in the mo re general portions, at bring the analyses to life. Keegan's introduction is in large measure a study of military history, at once a defense an critique, but also an effort to rescue the genre from its limitations. The authors of military history have been largely staff officers intent on "lessons," teachers in the military schools with much the same attitude, and amateur students of history, or of battle, or of both. The limitations derive from these facts, but lie deeper. The writers of military history have rare! gone beyond the fighting; they have taken what Keegan calls the "win/lose" approach, wh isolates the military story from the rest of history. He likens this method to the English and American trial by jury, which he calls "accusatory," an aggressive process intended to real verdict. The alternative approach is the French "investigatory" proceeding, in which the jug has wide powers of interrogation and investigation to aid in arriving at truth. Whatever the merits of the two legal proceduresa matter for serious thoughtth e analogy is a valuab stimulus to an examination of the preconceptions behind historical writing, especially but I exclusively military historical writing. The implication is that practicing historians, military a otherwise, may not be fully conscious of the theoretical underpinnings or ramifications of their procedures. Keegan's point, however, is especially applicable to the battle historian; if battle is not a crime, it is at least a definite event, and therefore possessed of parallels. In the "court of history," the question is always, Who was guilty of the result, if it was defeat, or responsib for the result, if it was victory? This commonest of approaches makes statements such as General A had not extended his flank . . . ," or, "If General B had moved up five minutes earlier. . . ." Obviously, this is too narrow an approach. Not only is it unsafe to assume tha the result of battle hinges on some single decision, but it is also true that not all battles ha clear victories or defeats for which credit and blame can be distributed. Deeper and more important, if the historian looks only for guilt or innocence, blame or responsibility, he will i reach an understanding of the total event or process in all its background and complexity. Keegan uses two examples to illustrate typical qualities of military history writing in the pa one is the English "philosopher of war," Sir Edward Creasy, the author of The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, first published in 1851 and often reprinted, extended, and imitated. Creasy, accepting the Victorian aversion to war but fascination by it, concentrate only on those battles which, as his title indicates, decided the course of history. The second example is Julius Caesar and his Gallic Wars, which is illustrative, perhaps originative, of much battle writing. Not only Caesar's but most succeeding battle accounts are from the view of the general, whether or not written by him. The resulting difficulties a view; and, more important to Keegan's argument, the creation of a seemingly clear and simple picture out of a very complicated and confused set of happenings. For the main body of